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Abstract  
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock 
auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid 
(HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the 
lowest  price  that  clears  the  market;  under  LAB,  the  winners  pay  the 
highest price that clears the market. In theory, both the HRB and LAB 
auctions maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our setting. Our 
experimental  results  indicate  that  the  LAB  auction  achieves  higher 
revenues.  This  revenue  result  may  explain  the  frequent  use  of  LAB 
pricing. On the other hand, HRB is successful in eliciting true values of 
the bidders both theoretically and experimentally.  
JEL codes: D44, C78, L96.  
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1  Introduction 
A common method to auction diamonds, radio spectrum, electricity, gas, and other products 
is the discrete clock auction. The auctioneer names a price and each bidder responds with her 
desired quantity. If there is excess demand, the auctioneer then names a higher price. The process 
continues  until  there  is  no  excess  demand.  This  format  is  used  for  auctioning  one  or  more 
products, where each product is either a single lot or many identical lots. 
The clock auction is best thought of as a dynamic version of a sealed-bid uniform-price 
auction. In the uniform-price auction, the auctioneer collects a demand curve for each product 
from each bidder, forms the aggregate demand curve, and crosses it with the supply curve to 
determine the market clearing price and the quantity won by each bidder. The clock auction does 
the same thing, but gathers the demand curves from each bidder in a sequence of discrete rounds, 
and bidders receive information about excess demand at the end of each round. Indeed, the 
sealed-bid uniform-price auction is just a single-round clock auction. In both clock auctions and 
uniform-price auctions, two pricing rules are commonly used: highest-rejected bid (HRB) and 
lowest-accepted bid (LAB). 
The LAB rule is used in treasury auctions in the US and elsewhere. These are sealed-bid 
uniform-price auctions. In contrast, clock auctions for diamonds, electricity and gas products in 
Europe have used the HRB rule.  
Discrete rounds are used in practice to simplify communication, make the process robust to 
communication  failures,  and  mitigate  tacit  collusion  (Ausubel  and  Cramton  2004).  An 
implication of discrete rounds is that the pricing rule matters. Another issue is whether the bidder 
specifies exit bids—the prices at which the bidder reduces the quantity demanded. In the limit as 
the size of the bid increment goes to zero, the distinction between pricing rules is irrelevant and 
exit bids are unnecessary. However, in practical auctions where the number of rounds often 
ranges from 4 to 10, discreteness matters. For example, in BHP Billiton’s diamond auctions, to 
limit participation costs the auctions are scheduled to complete in a half-day, which entails about 
4 to 10 comfortably paced rounds (Cramton et al. 2010). Similarly, medium-term electricity and 
gas auctions are scheduled to complete in one day to avoid overnight positions. These auctions   3 
typically last 6 to 12 rounds (Ausubel and Cramton 2004). In these settings, best practice is to 
have the bidder specify exit prices at which quantity reductions are desired. Exit bids make the 
discrete round auction much closer to a continuous auction and yet all the benefits of a discrete 
clock auction are retained. Exit bids are used in virtually all the major clock auctions in practice: 
diamonds, electricity, gas, and emission allowances (Ausubel and Cramton 2004, 2010; Cramton 
et al. 2010).  
In this paper, we examine bidding behavior in HRB and LAB versions of discrete clock 
auctions. In each version, after each round the bidders learn the aggregate demand. To prevent 
bid-sniping, an activity rule requires that a bidder’s quantity demanded cannot increase at higher 
prices. Bidders can only maintain or reduce quantity as the price rises. With many products, the 
simplest implementation is to require this monotonicity constraint for each product, as is done in 
diamond auctions. If the bidder reduces quantity in a round, the bidder names a price for each 
quantity reduction. The price of each reduction must be greater than the prior price and less than 
or equal to the current price. Each exit price is interpreted as the price at which the bidder is 
indifferent between the higher quantity and the lower quantity. If there is no excess demand at 
the current price, the supply is awarded to the highest bidders. The two versions differ in the 
pricing rule. Each winner pays the highest-rejected bid in HRB and the lowest accepted bid in 
LAB for the quantity won.  
At first glance, it would seem that selecting the highest market clearing price (LAB) would 
result in greater revenue than selecting the lowest market clearing price (HRB). The argument is 
incomplete, since the pricing rule influences behavior. LAB introduces an incentive for shading 
one’s bid below value. In simple cases (assuming one-lot per product, symmetry, independence, 
and risk neutrality), the bid shading under LAB exactly offsets the revenue gain from selecting 
the higher clearing price. Revenue equivalence obtains, and the two pricing rules result in the 
same expected revenue—at least in theory when bidders seek to maximize profits. 
The purpose of this  paper is to  examine the bidding behavior and  outcomes,  especially 
efficiency and revenue, under the two pricing rules experimentally. Our main hypothesis is that 
subjects  will  overbid  under  lowest-accepted  bid,  consistent  with  the  first-price  sealed-bid 
auction; whereas, under highest-rejected bid, bidders will bid truthfully. Thus, revenues under   4 
LAB will be higher than revenues under HRB. However, the efficiency comparison may go 
either  way  depending on  how  heterogeneous the  bidding  behavior  in  LAB  is.  Although  the 
formats apply to the general case of auctioning many lots of multiple products, for simplicity we 
restrict attention to the case of auctioning a single item. This simple case is important in practice. 
For example, diamond auctions often sell large stones as individual lots, each with its own price 
clock. Many lots are sold simultaneously, but each lot is cleared separately and monotonicity of 
demand is enforced lot-by-lot. 
It is a robust and puzzling finding of the experimental literature that in second-price sealed-
bid  auctions  subjects  bid  more  than  their  value  although  they  bid  truthfully  in  its  dynamic 
counterpart, the English auction (Cooper and Fang 2008; Coppinger et al. 1980; Kagel et al. 
1987, Kagel and Levin 1993). The HRB auction is somewhere between the English and second-
price auctions and these two are the limit cases of HRB. HRB converges to the English auction 
(continuous clock) when the number of rounds approaches infinity. When there is only one 
round, HRB is the same as the second-price auction. The exit bid decision in HRB requires 
similar strategic thinking as in a second-price sealed-bid auction. On the other hand, whether to 
stay in the auction is the same binary decision as in the English auction. Harstad (2000) finds that 
experience  with  the  English  auction  leads  to  less  overbidding  in  second-price  auctions. 
Moreover, he argues that the binary choice aspect of English auctions explains an important part 
of this learning. The HRB format allows subjects to make that kind of binary choice for early 
price increments and when they come to the price interval where they want to exit, they have this 
experience. In this respect, studying discrete clock auctions helps us understand what makes 
subjects overbid in second-price auctions and bid truthfully in English auctions.  
The LAB pricing rule is analogous to a first-price sealed-bid auction. In particular, if there is 
only one round and one good, the LAB and first-price auctions are the same. Another robust 
finding of the experimental literature is that bidders in a first-price auction overbid compared to 
the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium prediction (see Cox, et al. 1982, 1988, as the seminal papers;   5 
Kagel and Levin 2008 for a detailed survey).
2 Therefore, we expect to see overbidding in the 
LAB auction. 
Ausubel et. al. (2009) and Kagel and Levin (2001) are the most related papers to our work. 
Ausubel et al. (2009) compares a particular discrete clock with the sealed-bid auction in common 
value settings. The study considers reverse auctions where the bidders have liquidity needs. It 
tests whether dynamic or sealed bid formats lead to better price discovery (of the commonly 
valued goods) and identifies the format that allows bid ders to satisfy the liquidity needs of the 
bidders. Kagel and Levin (2001) uses a continuous clock auction in a multi-unit setting; the aim 
of the study is to understand demand reduction in sealed-bid uniform-price and continuous clock 
auctions experimentally. Our study aims to understand the implications of different pricing rules 
in  discrete  clock  auctions  in  private  value  settings.
3  No  other  paper  to  date  makes  this 
comparison. 
Since we find experimentally that subjects do not deviate from the straightfo rward bidding 
strategy (bidding truth value) in HRB, it is confirmed that dynamic formats make it easier for the 
bidders to recognize equilibrium strategies. Having a discrete clock makes HRB more practical 
than the English auction, and yet it s till is successful in eliciting the true values in  our 
experiment. 
Our results indicate that revenues under LAB are significantly higher than under HRB. 
Thus, in settings where revenue is the predominant objective, the seller may favor LAB, but in 
settings where simplicity and gathering the true value of the bidders are of greater concern, then 
                                                            
 
2 Risk aversion offers one explanation, but this has proven inadequate (see Kagel 1995). Several papers 
explain the overbidding phenomena with behavioral motives (for example, Goeree et al. 2002, Crawford 
and Iriberri 2007; Delgado et al. 2008; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 
2007; Lange and Ratan 2009). 
3 Although many auctioned goods have some common value characteristics, it is certainly the case that in 
electricity, gas, radio spectrum, and diamond auctions, each firm has private production and operation 
costs and may face different demands. We believe it is useful to begin with the private values case as it is 
also argued to be important in the literature. For example, Goeree, Offerman, and Sloof (2009) and Kagel 
and  Levin  (2001)  study  the  issues  related  with  spectrum  auctions  ( such  as  demand  reduction  or 
preemptive bidding) in private value settings.  
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the seller may favor HRB. In terms of efficiency, we do not find any difference between the two 
formats experimentally. 
In Section 2, we begin with a presentation of the theory. Equilibrium bidding strategies for 
the two versions of the discrete clock auction are characterized in Cramton and Sujarittanonta 
(2010). Here we summarize the results and provide the equilibrium bidding strategies for our 
experimental setting. The experimental design and the results are discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2  Theory  
There is one indivisible good for sale to N > 1 risk neutral bidders. Bidder i’s private value 
for the good is vi where each vi is independently drawn from a commonly known distribution F 
on       with corresponding positive density function f. Assume that the hazard rate function 
associated with F is increasing. Bidder i’s payoff if she wins the good at a price p is vi – p. 
Otherwise, it is equal to 0. The seller values the good at 0. 
Before the auction starts, the seller announces a vector of bid levels,     (            ) 
where    is the price at round t and T is the number of bid levels. The clock price increases every 
round so that                           . The auction begins in round one at a price   . 
In each round t, each bidder chooses either to bid at the current clock price or to exit. The 
bidders who bid at the current clock price are called active bidders. At the beginning of each 
round, the bidders know the number of active bidders. When a bidder exits, she submits an exit 
bid. Once a bidder exits she cannot bid again. If more than one bidder stays in, the auction 
proceeds to the next round. If all but one bidder exit, then the bidder who stayed in wins the 
good. If all bidders exit, then the bidder who submitted the highest exit bid wins the good. The 
payments depend on the auction format. 
2.1  Highest-rejected-bid (HRB) 
In the HRB format, the final price is determined by the highest-rejected bid. If a bidder exits 
in round t, the bidder submits an exit bid—a price between      and    at which she wants to   7 
exit. If more than one bidder remains, the auction continues to another round; if all but one 
bidder exits, the remaining bidder wins and pays the highest exit bid; if all bidders exit, the 
bidder with the highest exit bid wins and pays the second-highest exit bid. 
Proposition 1. In the HRB auction, truthful bidding (bidding up to one’s value) is a weakly-
dominant strategy. The HRB auction is efficient and maximizes seller revenue.  
The dominant strategy result is standard and holds regardless of the number of bidders, the 
number of goods, or how values are drawn. All that is required is that each bidder demands only 
a single good. Thus, highest-rejected bid is the Vickrey price, thereby inducing truthful bidding. 
In our setting, efficiency is an immediate implication of truthful bidding. With the additional 
assumption of an increasing hazard rate, the optimal seller revenue can be achieved with the 
optimal  reserve  price.  Nevertheless,  among  auctions  with  the  same  reserve  price,  the  HRB 
auction yields the highest revenue due to the revenue equivalence theorem.   
The HRB auction has extremely desirable properties in our setting. It is both efficient and 
maximizes seller revenues. Moreover, the bidding strategy is simple—just bid up to your true 
value—and is best regardless of what the other bidders are doing. Another important property of 
the HRB auction is that a bidder cannot lose at an affordable price as long as she bids her value. 
Hence, neither the winner nor the loser ever regrets having bid as they bid. The winner could not 
do better by exiting earlier; the loser could not do better by staying in longer. 
2.2  Lowest-accepted-bid (LAB) 
In the LAB format, the final price is determined by the lowest-accepted bid. If a bidder exits 
in round t, the bidder submits an exit bid—a price between      and    at which she wants to 
exit. If more than one bidder remains, the auction continues to another round; if all but one 
bidder exits, the remaining bidder wins and pays the current price; if all bidders exit, the bidder 
with the highest exit bid wins and pays her exit bid. 
Proposition 2. In the symmetric equilibrium of the LAB auction, a bidder, who exits at   , 
bids  (       )                        where     is the highest of       independently drawn   8 
values  and  k  is  the  number  of  bidders  present  at      .  The  LAB  auction  is  efficient  and 
maximizes seller revenue.  
Although it is discontinuous, the equilibrium bid function in the LAB auction is monotone in 
value. Therefore, the LAB auction is efficient in our symmetric setting. Similar to the HRB 
auction, the highest seller revenue in the LAB auction can be achieved with an optimal reserve 
price  and  among  auctions  with  the  same  reserve  price,  the  LAB  auction  yields  maximum 
revenue. Nonetheless, one might favor the HRB auction because of its simple bidding strategy 
without bid shading. In the LAB auction, bidders must do a difficult equilibrium calculation to 
determine the optimal level of bid shading.  
2.3  Theoretical predictions for the parameters used in the experiment 
  In our experiment, two bidders compete to buy a single good. Bidder i’s private value for 
the good is vi where each vi is independently drawn from the uniform distribution on    50,100  
and    50,60,70,80,90,100  P .  
By Proposition 1, in HRB the bidder submits her value as an exit bid.  
By Proposition 2, in LAB the equilibrium strategy is given in Table 1. Any equilibrium 
exit should occur either in round 1, 3 or 5. Here is some intuition. Given the prior distribution, 
the equilibrium bid of a first price sealed bid auction is 25+1/2v. A bidder with a value higher 
than 70 would like to submit an exit bid higher than 60. Hence, any bidder with value less than 
70 exits in round 1 and submits the exit bid 25+1/2v. Once, the price level increases in round 2, 
each active bidder updates her prior such that the values of the remaining bidders are 70 or more.  
Given the updated distribution (uniform between 70 and 100), the equilibrium bid is 35+1/2v. 
But this requires the lowest bid to be 70. Hence, no bidder drops out in the second round. Since 
no one drops outs in round 2, nothing more is learned. In round 3, any bidder with a value less 
than 90 exits and submits the corresponding exit bid. Once, the price level increases to  90 in 
round 4, each active bidder updates that the lowest possible value should be 90. Since bidders 
with values higher than 90 would like to submit bids that are higher than 80, they will wait for 
round 5. Given the updated distribution (uniform between 90 and 100) the equilibrium bid is 
45+1/2v. The active bidders wait for round 5 and submit the corresponding exit bids.   9 
-Table 1- 
Ex ante symmetry—the fact that the bidders’ values are drawn from the same distribution—
is critical for Proposition 2. This allows for a symmetric equilibrium. Since the exit bid functions 
are the same and strictly increasing, the bidder with the highest value wins and the outcome is 
efficient.  Revenue  maximization  then  follows  from  the  revenue  equivalence  theorem.  The 
assignment is the same as in the HRB auction, and both auctions give the bidder with a value of 
50 a payoff of 0.  
Ex  post  revenues  differ  between  HRB  and  LAB.  For  each  realization  of  values,  the 
equilibrium revenue in HRB is equal to the second-highest value. However, the revenue in LAB, 
may not even be equal to the exit bid of the high value bidder. For a given price level, if one 
bidder stays in while the other one drops out, the winner pays the current price level rather than 
her intended equilibrium exit bid. 
3  Experimental method 
The  experiments  were  run  at  the  Experimental  Economics  Lab  at  the  University  of 
Maryland. There were 184 participants, all undergraduate students at the University of Maryland. 
The experiment involved two treatments: HRB and LAB. We conducted six sessions for each of 
the auction formats, HRB1 to HRB6 and LAB1 to LAB6. For each treatment, the numbers of 
participants in session one to six were 16, 14, 16, 16, 16 and 14, respectively. The random draws 
were balanced in the sense that we used the same sequence of random number “seed” values for 
each auction format, so the random value draws for HRB1 matched the random draws for LAB1. 
A new set of random draws was used for the second session in each format, etc. 
No subject participated in more than one session. Participants were seated in isolated booths. 
Each session lasted about 80 minutes. Bidder instructions for each treatment are in the Appendix. 
To test each subject’s understanding of the instructions, a subject had to answer a sequence of 
multiple choice questions. The auctions in a session did not begin until all the subjects answered 
all of the multiple choice questions correctly.    10 
In each session, each subject participated in 21 auctions. The first auction was a practice 
auction. Each auction had two bidders, selected at random among the subjects. Bidders were 
randomly  rematched  after  each auction.  All  bidding  was anonymous.  Bids  were  entered  via 
computer. The experiment is programmed in z-Tree (Fishbacher 2007). At the conclusion of 
each auction, the bidder learned whether she won and the price paid by the winning bidder. 
Bidders had independent private values for a fictitious good with values drawn uniformly 
from 50 to 100. The number of rounds was selected to approximate those of actual auctions. For 
example in diamond auctions for large stones, typically there are 4-6 rounds and increments are 
10%-20%  of  the  price  range.  There  were  a  maximum  of  five  rounds  in  our  discrete  clock 
auctions and the price increments were 20% of the price range.  
The winner in each auction earned her value minus the price paid in Experimental Currency 
Units (ECU). At the end of the experiment, total earnings were converted to US Dollars, at the 
conversion  rate  of  10  ECU  =  1  US  Dollar.  Subjects  also  received  a  $5  show-up  fee.  Cash 
payments were made at the conclusion of the experiment. The average subject payment was 
$19.51. 
4  Experimental results  
As in any dynamic auction, bidding strategies of all bidders are not observable. For example, 
in the Dutch auction only the bid of the winner, or in the English auction only the bids of the 
losers  are  observable.  Nonetheless,  it  is  still  possible  to  make  revenue  and  efficiency 
comparisons, which are important in auction design. Later, we will study the bidding strategies 
based on the observable bids. Among 920 auctions we conducted per treatment, we observed 
1,092 and 1,103 exit bids in HRB and LAB, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the actual (what we observed in the experiment) efficiency and revenue, and 
the theoretical revenue (equilibrium revenue given the realization of values) of each treatment 
for the aggregate data. Both treatments, HRB and LAB, yield the efficient allocation with high 
frequency in each session (see Figure 1) and nearly 100% of the gains from trade are realized in 
both treatments. Using the 6 independent sessions per treatment, the Mann-Whitney rank test 
shows  no  significant  difference  in  efficiencies  (z=0.40,  p=0.69),  but  it  shows  a  significant   11 
difference in revenues between treatments (z = -2.88, p = 0.00) (see Figure 2). Furthermore, 
Mann-Whitney rank tests indicate that the actual revenue in LAB is significantly higher than the 
theoretical prediction (z = -2.88, p = 0.00) but there is no significant difference between the 







This evidence implies that subjects bid more aggressively than the equilibrium prediction in 
LAB while in HRB subjects bid close to the predictions of the theory. As a result the seller 
receives  higher  revenue  in  LAB.  The  bidding  behaviors  in  HRB  and  LAB  are  investigated 
further in the next subsections.  
One natural question is whether the relationship between actual and theoretical revenues in 
the two formats depends on the period or is persistent in the experiment. Figure 3 plots the 
average differences between the actual and theoretical revenues period by period. The actual 
revenues  we  observed  in  HRB  are  close  to  the  prediction  of  the  theory  throughout  the 
experiment. The regression of the difference between actual and theoretical revenues gives a 
significant coefficient for period and the constant is also significant. In HRB, actual revenue gets 
closer to the theoretical revenue: using the data from the six independent sessions of HRB, the 
Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test  shows  that  although  the  average  difference  between  actual  and 
theoretical revenue is significantly less than 0 in the first 10 periods (z=-0.99, p<0.05), this 
difference is not significantly different from 0 in the last 10 periods (z=0.11, p=0.92). The actual 
revenues in LAB are persistently higher than the theoretical ones as can be seen in Figure 3 and 
Table 3. In the regression for the difference between actual and theoretical revenues in LAB, 
only the constant was significant but not the coefficient of period. Moreover, the difference 
between actual and theoretical revenues is significantly higher than 0 both in the first 10 (z=2.20, 
p<0.05) and last 10 periods (z=2.20, p<0.05). 
-Figure 3- 
   12 
-Table 3- 
4.1  Bidding behavior in treatment HRB 
Subjects submitted a total of 1093 exit bids in 920 auctions. Figure 4 plots exit bids and 
corresponding values in HRB. The dashed line is the truthful bid function which is what the 
theory suggests. Although there were instances of bid shading and bidding above one’s value, 
most of the exit bids were around the 45 degree line.  
-Figure 4- 
As  shown  in  Figure  5,  83.9%  of exit  bids  were  submitted  in  the  round  that  the  theory 
predicts and 13.6% of exit bids were submitted earlier than predicted. Among those who exited 
in the predicted round, 64.9% submitted exit bids within one percent of the exit bids suggested 
by the theory; 26.1% underbid and 9% overbid. 
-Figure 5- 
The vast majority of subjects were successful in waiting until the right round to exit. Since 
the binary decision of staying in or out is similar to the strategic thinking of the English auction, 
this finding is in line with the success of value bidding in English auction experiments. Harstad 
(2000) finds that subjects who gain experience in auctions with this kind of binary decision 
making  perform  better  in  discovering  the  value  bidding  strategy  in  second-price  sealed-bid 
auctions. Staying in the HRB auction until the price reaches the correct level provides a similar 
experience as participating in an English auction.  
4.2  Bidding behavior in treatment LAB 
A total of 1,103 exit bids were submitted in 920 LAB auctions that are conducted. Figure 6 
plots exit bids and corresponding values in LAB. The dashed line is the theoretical bid function 
as studied in Table 1.  
-Figure 6- 
Figure 7 shows that many subjects failed to exit in the round that the theory predicted. Only 
58% exited in the correct round and 26% of the exit bids were submitted later than predicted. 
Even among the ones who exited in the predicted round, 44.4% overbid while 34.7% of those   13 
who  exited  in  the  predicted  round  did  submit  exit  bids  within  one  percent  of  the  exit  bids 
suggested by the theory and 20.9% underbid. 
-Figure 7- 
 
The high revenue in the LAB auction is caused by two types of upward deviations: (1) the 
winner submits a higher exit bid than predicted and (2) either bidder stays in too long. The first 
type involves a winner exiting at the round theory predicted and then submitting a too-high exit 
bid. The second type involves a winner, loser or both: a winner may drop out too late; or a loser 
who drops out too late extends the auction and thus raises the final price. Table 4 shows the 
difference between actual and theoretical revenues for each type of deviation. The relative effect 
of the second type of deviation is much stronger than the first. Furthermore, the second type of 
deviation was observed more frequently. These two types of deviation can take place in the same 
auction but there was only one auction with both types of deviation.  
-Table 4- 
5  Conclusion 
The pricing rule is of fundamental importance in practical auction design. Pricing impacts 
both the efficiency and the revenues of the auction. Although there is an immense literature on 
the pricing rule in static (sealed-bid) auctions—first-price vs. second-price in single unit auctions 
and pay-as-bid vs. uniform-price in multi-unit auctions—little is known about alternative pricing 
rules in the dynamic auctions commonly used in practice. We show how different pricing rules 
influence bidding behavior in discrete clock auctions in a simple setting.  
Based  on  the  standard  theory  in  which  bidders  seek  to  maximize  profits,  the  highest-
rejected-bid  (HRB)  and  the  lowest  accepted-bid  (LAB)  auctions  both  seem  attractive.  They 
maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our unit-demand setting. Despite this theoretical 
result, LAB pricing is often used in practice. In our experiments, both formats performed equally 
well and close to the theoretical predictions in terms of efficiency. However, the LAB auction 
yielded higher revenues than the HRB auction.    14 
Although there is significant overbidding in LAB, this overbidding is not as severe as in 
LAB’s limit case, the first-price sealed-bid auction. The dynamic auction, focusing initially on 
the binary in/out decision, appears to limit overbidding. This suggests an interesting tradeoff 
between price increments and revenues. 
Developing strategies in HRB requires two things: when to exit as in an English auction, and 
what exit bid to submit as in a second-price sealed bid auction. Most bidders submit exit bids 
close to their values. The tendency of bidding above value found in second-price auctions is not 
observed here. We conjecture that this is due to the experience bidders gain in deciding whether 
to exit each round. That reasoning process is similar to decision making in an English auction. 
Harstad  (2000)  finds  that  practicing  English  auctions  improves  performance  in  second-price 
sealed-bid auctions. Similarly, our experiment shows that the multiple-round implementation of 
the  second-price  auction  eliminates  the  tendency  to  overbid  when  faced  with  second-price 
incentives. The dynamic implementation also limits the spread between the highest bid and the 
price to at most one bid increment.  
     15 
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Table 1. Equilibrium Strategy for LAB Auction 
Value  Exit Round  Exit bid function 
  50,70   1  1












Table 2. Outcomes of Treatment HRB and LAB 
  HRB  LAB 












     Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3. Regression of the Difference between Actual and Theoretical Revenues in 
HRB and LAB Auctions 












Session fixed effect  YES  YES 
N  920  920 
*** Significant at 99% confidence interval. Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
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Table 4. Difference between actual and theoretical revenues by type of deviation 
Type of upward deviation  Average difference 




Winner exiting  at the predicted round 




Any bidder staying in for too long  9.85 
(0.20) 
260 
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
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Figure 4. Plot between values and exit bids in HRB (all data) 
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Figure 5. Deviations from the predicted exit rounds in HRB 
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Difference between actual and theoretical exit round   23 
Appendix: Bidder Instructions 
Treatment HRB 
Experiment Instructions 
Welcome to the auction experiment. In this experiment, you will participate in auctions as a 
bidder. The precise rules and procedures that govern the operation of these auctions will be 
explained to you below. 
Various  research  foundations  have  provided  funds  for  this  research. The  instructions  are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can finish the experiment 
with  a  considerable  amount  of  money,  which  will  be  paid  to  you  in  cash  at  the  end.  The 
experiment will last about 80 minutes. 
The  type  of  currency  used  in  this  experiment  is  Experimental  Currency  Units  (ECU). 
Participants completing the session do not risk losing any money. At the end of the experiment 
all your earnings will be converted to US Dollars. The conversion rate is 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. 
You will be paid in cash when you finish the experiment. The more ECU you earn, the more US 
Dollars you earn. If you participate in this experiment until the session is over, then you will be 
paid an additional 5 US Dollars. 
Auction Rules and Calculation of Earnings 
You will be participating in 20 auctions. At the beginning of the first auction, you will be 
randomly matched with another participant in this room; every auction, you will be randomly re-
matched with a different participant. In each auction you will be bidding against the participant 
with whom you are matched. 
In a given auction, there is a fictitious good that is sold and your aim is to bid in order to win 
this good. When the first auction starts, you will observe your valuation of the fictitious good. 
Your valuation is a number between 50 and 100 and it is randomly selected from the [50,100] 
interval with equal probability and rounded to the nearest cent. The other bidder participating in 
this auction also receives his or her independent valuation for the fictitious good and his or her 
valuation is also randomly selected from [50,100] interval. Each bidder will know only his or her 
own valuation.  
The price for the fictitious good will start at 50 and will gradually increase to 60, 70, 80, 90, 
and 100. At price level 50, both you and your opponent are in the auction. The computer will ask 
you if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases to 60. You either stay IN   24 
which indicates that you are willing to pay 60 for the good or you stay OUT. If you stay out for 
at a price of 60, you need to enter an exit bid which must be an amount between 50 and 60. The 
exit bid is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay for the good. For example, if you 
stay out and indicate that your exit bid is 54, then it means you would be willing to pay at most 
54 for the good. The exit bid has to be an amount between the previous price level and the 
current price at which you are staying out. There are four possible things that can happen: 
  You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT with an exit bid of, say, 55: Then you win the 
fictitious good and pay 55, your opponent’s exit bid.  
  You stay OUT with exit bid of, say 57, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent 
wins the fictitious good and pays 57, your exit bid. 
  You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted the highest 
exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays the smaller of the exit bids. 
  You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level which is 70. 
 
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 60, then the computer will 
ask if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases to 70. Again there are four 
possible things that can happen: 
  You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT with exit bid of, say, 65: Then you win the 
fictitious good and pay 65, your opponent’s exit bid.  
  You stay OUT with exit bid of, say 67, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent 
wins the fictitious good and pays 67, your exit bid. 
  You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted the highest 
exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays the smaller of the exit bids. 
  You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level which is 80. 
 
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 70, then the computer will 
ask if you would like to stay in the auction at a price of 80. 
The same procedure will repeat for price levels of 90 and 100. If both of you are still in the 
auction when the price level is 100, then the computer will randomly assign the fictitious good to 
one of the bidders with equal chance and that bidder will pay 100.   25 
Please note that the price level increases only if both bidders stay in the auction. If only one 
bidder stays in and the other one stays out with an exit bid, the bidder who is in wins the good 
and pays the exit bid of the other bidder. Otherwise, if both bidders stay out then the one with the 
higher exit bid wins the good and pays the exit bid of the other bidder. For example, when the 
price level is 70, if you indicate to stay OUT with exit bid of 63, and your opponent indicates to 
stay OUT with exit bid of 67, then your opponent wins the good (he or she has the higher exit 
bid) and pays 63 (which is the smaller exit bid). If you both submit the same exit bid while 
staying out then, the computer randomly assigns the good to one of the bidders, and the winner 
pays the exit bid of the other. 
When one bidder wins the good, the auction is over. If you are the winner at a certain price, 
then you earn the difference between your valuation and the price. For example, let us say you 
have a valuation of 82.55 for the fictitious good in the current auction and you win the good at a 
price of 61. Then your earning from this round is  
Earning = 82.55 – 61 = 21.55 ECU 
When the first auction is completed, the second auction will start. At the beginning of the 
second auction, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room and play 
with that person in this round. First, the computer will show you your new valuation for the good 
for this auction. It is again a randomly selected number from [50,100] interval. Your opponent 
will also observe his or her own valuation for the good for this auction privately. The same 
auction rules as in the first auction will apply. 
There  are  20  auctions  in  total.  The  computer  will  sum  up  your  earnings  in  ECU  in  all 
auctions and convert this amount to the US Dollars by dividing by 10. We will pay you this 
amount in cash at the end of the experiment in person. 
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the auction, we have a test period 
before the real session starts. In this test period, you will see some multiple choice questions 
about the auction rules. Please answer those questions to the best of your knowledge. You may 
look  at  the  hard  copy  of  the  instructions  while  answering  them.  Once  you  answer  all  the 
questions correctly, one practice auction will be conducted for which no payment will be made. 
Then the experiment will start with 20 real auctions. 
Please ask if you have any questions. 
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Questions for the test period (asked to the subjects during the test period by the computer) 
1)  The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay 
in at a price of 70. You said that you are IN and your opponent said that he or she is OUT 
with an exit bid of 65. Then what would be the outcome of the auction? 
a)  You would win the good and pay 60. 
b)  Your opponent would win the good and pay 70. 
c)  You would win the good and pay 65. 
d)  Nobody would win the good and the price would move to 80. 
Answer: (c) 
2)  The price level just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay 
in for price level 80. You decided to stay OUT for price level of 80. What are the possible 
exit bids you may enter? 
a)  Any amount between 65 and 70. 
b)  Any amount between 70 and 80. 
c)  Any amount between 60 and 70. 
d)  Any amount between 80 and 90. 
Answer: (b) 
3)  Let us say, your valuation of the good is 91 for the current round. The price level just moved 
from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay in for price level 80. You 
said that you are OUT with an exit bid of 77 and your opponent said that he or she is OUT 
with an exit bid of 74. Then what would be your and your opponent’s earnings for this 
round? 
a)  You would win the good and pay 77. You would earn 14 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
b)  Your opponent would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 0 and you cannot 
know your opponent’s earning without knowing his or her valuation. 
c)  You would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 11 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
d)  You would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 17 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
Answer: (d)   27 
Treatment LAB 
Experiment Instructions 
Welcome to the auction experiment. In this experiment, you will participate in auctions as a 
bidder. The precise rules and procedures that govern the operation of these auctions will be 
explained to you below. 
Various  research  foundations  have  provided  funds  for  this  research. The  instructions  are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can finish the experiment 
with  a  considerable  amount  of  money,  which  will  be  paid  to  you  in  cash  at  the  end.  The 
experiment will last about 80 minutes. 
The  type  of  currency  used  in  this  experiment  is  Experimental  Currency  Units  (ECU). 
Participants completing the session do not risk losing any money. At the end of the experiment 
all your earnings will be converted to US Dollars. The conversion rate is 10 ECU = 1 US Dollar. 
You will be paid in cash when you finish the experiment. The more ECU you earn, the more US 
Dollars you earn. If you participate in this experiment until the session is over, then you will be 
paid an additional 5 US Dollars. 
Auction Rules and Calculation of Earnings 
You will be participating in 20 auctions. At the beginning of the first auction, you will be 
randomly matched with another participant in this room; every auction, you will be randomly re-
matched with a different participant. In each auction you will be bidding against the participant 
with whom you are matched. 
In a given auction, there is a fictitious good that is sold and your aim is to bid in order to win 
this good. When the first auction starts, you will observe your valuation of the fictitious good. 
Your valuation is a number between 50 and 100 and it is randomly selected from the [50,100] 
interval with equal probability and rounded to the nearest cent. The other bidder participating in 
this auction also receives his or her independent valuation for the fictitious good and his or her 
valuation is also randomly selected from [50,100] interval. Each bidder will know only his or her 
own valuation.  
The price for the fictitious good will start at 50 and will gradually increase to 60, 70, 80, 90, 
and 100. At price level 50, both you and your opponent are in the auction. The computer will ask 
you if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases to 60. You either stay IN 
which indicates that you are willing to pay 60 for the good or you stay OUT. If you stay out at a   28 
price of 60, you need to enter an exit bid which must be an amount between 50 and 60. The exit 
bid is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay for the good. For example, if you stay out 
and indicate that your exit bid is 54, then it means you would be willing to pay at most 54 for the 
good. The exit bid has to be an amount between the previous price level and the current price at 
which you are staying out. There are four possible things that can happen: 
  You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good and pay 60.  
  You stay OUT, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the fictitious good 
and pays 60. 
  You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted the highest 
exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays his or her exit bid. 
  You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level which is 70. 
 
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 60, then the computer will 
ask if you would like to stay in the auction when the price increases to 70. Again there are four 
possible things that can happen: 
  You stay IN, and your opponent stays OUT: Then you win the fictitious good and pay 70.  
  You stay OUT, and your opponent stays IN: Then your opponent wins the fictitious good 
and pays 70. 
  You stay OUT, your opponent stays OUT: Then the bidder who submitted the highest 
exit bid wins the fictitious good and pays his or her exit bid. 
  You stay IN, your opponent stays IN: Then the price moves to the next level which is 80. 
 
If both you and your opponent stay in the auction for price level 70, then the computer will 
ask if you would like to stay in the auction at a price of 80. 
The same procedure will repeat for price levels of 90 and 100. If both of you are still in the 
auction when the price level is 100, then the computer will randomly assign the fictitious good to 
one of the bidders with equal chance and that bidder will pay 100. 
Please note that the price level increases only if both bidders stay in the auction. If only one 
bidder stays in and the other one stays out, the bidder who is in wins the good and pays the price 
for which he or she indicated to stay in. Otherwise, if both bidders stay out then the one with the 
higher exit bid wins the good and pays his or her exit bid. For example, when the price level is   29 
70, if you indicate to stay OUT with exit bid of 63, and your opponent indicates to stay OUT 
with exit bid of 67, then your opponent wins the good (he or she has the higher exit bid) and pays 
67 (his or her exit bid). If you both submit the same exit bid while staying out then, the computer 
randomly assigns the good to one of the bidders, and the winner pays his or her exit bid. 
When one bidder wins the good, the auction is over. If you are the winner at a certain price, 
then you earn the difference between your valuation and the price. For example, let us say you 
have a valuation of 82.55 for the fictitious good in the current auction and you win the good at a 
price of 61. Then your earning from this round is  
Earning = 82.55 – 61 = 21.55 ECU 
When the first auction is completed, the second auction will start. At the beginning of the 
second auction, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room and play 
with that person in this round. First, the computer will show you your new valuation for the good 
for this auction. It is again a randomly selected number from [50,100] interval. Your opponent 
will also observe his or her own valuation for the good for this auction privately. The same 
auction rules as in the first auction will apply. 
There  are  20  auctions  in  total.  The  computer  will  sum  up  your  earnings  in  ECU  in  all 
auctions and convert this amount to the US Dollars by dividing by 10. We will pay you this 
amount in cash at the end of the experiment in person. 
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the auction, we have a test period 
before the real session starts. In this test period, you will see some multiple choice questions 
about the auction rules. Please answer those questions to the best of your knowledge. You may 
look  at  the  hard  copy  of  the  instructions  while  answering  them.  Once  you  answer  all  the 
questions correctly, one practice auction will be conducted for which no payment will be made. 
Then the experiment will start with 20 real auctions. 
Please ask if you have any questions. 
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Questions for the test period (asked to the subjects during the test period by the computer) 
1)  The price level just moved from 60 to 70 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay 
in at a price of 70. You said that you are IN and your opponent said that he or she is OUT 
with an exit bid of 65. Then what would be the outcome of the auction? 
a)  You would win the good and pay 70. 
b)  Your opponent would win the good and pay 70. 
c)  You would win the good and pay 65. 
d)  Nobody would win the good and the price would move to 80. 
Answer: (a) 
2)  The price level just moved from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay 
in for price level 80. You decided to stay OUT for price level of 80. What are the possible 
exit bids you may enter? 
a)  Any amount between 65 and 70. 
b)  Any amount between 70 and 80. 
c)  Any amount between 60 and 70. 
d)  Any amount between 80 and 90. 
Answer: (b) 
3)  Let us say, your valuation of the good is 91 for the current round. The price level just moved 
from 70 to 80 and the computer asks you if you would like to stay in for price level 80. You 
said that you are OUT with an exit bid of 77 and your opponent said that he or she is OUT 
with an exit bid of 74. Then what would be your and your opponent’s earnings for this 
round? 
a)  You would win the good and pay 77. You would earn 14 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
b)  Your opponent would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 0 and you cannot 
know your opponent’s earning without knowing his or her valuation. 
c)  You would win the good and pay 80. You would earn 11 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
d)  You would win the good and pay 74. You would earn 17 and your opponent 
would earn 0. 
Answer: (a) 